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CONTRACTS VS. SALARIES IN MATCHING
FEDERICO ECHENIQUE
Abstract. Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that
govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms
regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be
understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the as-
sumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable match-
ings of workers and firms.
Workers and firms may bargain over general, multi-dimensional con-
tracts; they may negotiate over health benefits, housing, retirement
plans, etc. Substitutes, on the other hand, is the assumption com-
monly placed on firms’ preferences to guarantee the existence of stable
matchings of workers and firms. In this note I show that, when firms
regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be em-
bedded into a model of bargaining over wages.
The economics of the embedding is straightforward, except for a
small twist. When a firm and a worker negotiate over a contract,
they may bargain over many dimensions. However, the Pareto frontier
of contracts is, in a sense, “one-dimensional:” what is better for the
worker is worse for the firm. So Pareto optimal contracts may be viewed
as salaries, with the better contracts for the firm meaning lower salaries,
and the better contracts for the worker meaning higher salaries. The
twist is that a firm’s ranking over contracts might be affected by the
firm’s other hires. For example, health plan A may be better than B
for a firm if it has many employees, but B beats A if it has few. When
contracts are substitutes, it turns out that the ranking is not affected
in this way.
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a model of two-sided worker-
firm matching with contracts. A firm will hire a collection of workers,
and will negotiate a contract with each one of them. The model is a
generalization of Kelso and Crawford (1982), where each firm and each
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worker negotiate a wage.1 Kelso and Crawford show that, when firms’
demands satisfy gross substitutes, the core of the matching market is
nonempty. Hatfield and Milgrom show that, when the firms’ prefer-
ences over contracts satisfy their notion of substitutes, the core of the
market is nonempty.
I show that Hatfield and Milgrom’s model can be embedded into
the model of Kelso and Crawford. Hatfield and Milgrom’s assump-
tion of substitutability enables an embedding where firms’ demands
for workers satisfy Kelso and Crawford’s notion of gross substitutes.
As a result, the nonemptiness of the core follows from the argument
in Kelso and Crawford, and their salary adjustment algorithm finds a
stable matching of workers to firms, and a vector of supporting salaries.
Hatfield and Milgrom’s paper is an elegant analysis of two-sided
matching. It simplifies matching models, and makes their relationship
to auction models more transparent. Their paper contributes much
more than showing the nonemptiness of the core when firms and work-
ers can sign general contracts; and my result does not diminish their
contribution in the least. I believe, however, that there is value in
clarifying the relationship between contracts and salaries. One step in
that direction is taken by Hatfield and Kojima (2010), who investigate
conditions on preferences over contracts that are weaker than substi-
tutes and still generate stable matchings. My embedding does not work
under Hatfield and Kojima’s weaker conditions (see 2.3 below).
Future research should explain the consequences of the added gen-
erality of contracts over salaries in different economic environments. A
paper that seeks to extend some classical result on matching to match-
ing with contracts would need to sort out to what extent allowing for
contracts provides a more general result. It may be that contracts are
not more general; which would not by itself invalidate the exercise, but
would be an important feature to understand.
1. Embedding
1.1. Definitions. I shall describe two models. The model of a match-
ing market with contracts with substitutable choices is due to Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005). The model of a matching market with salaries
and gross substitutes in demand is due to Kelso and Crawford (1982).
1.1.1. Contracts. A matching market with contracts is described by:
1Kelso and Crawford build on the analysis of Crawford and Knoer (1981); see
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a description of the models.
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• (finite, disjoint) sets W of workers, F of firms and X of con-
tracts; each contract x ∈ X is assigned one worker xW ∈ W
and one firm xF ∈ F ;
• for each worker w ∈ W , a utility function uw : X ∪ {∅} → R;
and for each firm f ∈ F , a utility function uf : 2X → R; all
utility functions are one-to-one (preferences are strict).
A firm f ’s utility function determines a choice rule Cf : for A ⊆ X,
Cf (A) is the maximal subset of A according to uf . Note that since uf
is one-to-one, Cf (A) is uniquely defined. The empty set ∅ represents
for f the option of hiring no workers. For notational convenience, I
have not restricted the domain of uf to contracts with f = xF , but
of course we want f to sign contracts only in its own name; assume
then that x ∈ Cf (A) implies f = xF . Assume also that x, x′ ∈ Cf (A)
implies xW 6= x′W .
For a worker w, ∅ represents an outside option: a contract that is
always available to her if she chooses to reject the contract some firm
offers her. Suppose that if xW 6= w then uw(x) < uw(∅).
A set of contracts A is feasible if, for all workers w, there is at most
one x ∈ A with w = xW .
A firm f ’s utility satisfies substitutability if, for any set of contracts
A, and any two contracts x and x′, x /∈ Cf (A ∪ {x}) implies x /∈
Cf (A ∪ {x, x′}).
The tuple (F,W,X, (uf ), (uw)) describes a a matching market with
contracts.
A set of contracts A ⊆ X is individually rational if, for all x ∈ A,
uxW (x) ≥ uxW (∅); and for all firms f , Cf (A) = {x ∈ A : f = xF}.
A set of contracts A ⊆ X is stable if it is individually rational and if
for any firm f and set of contracts A′ 6= A with A′ = Cf (A∪A′), there
is one contract x′ ∈ A′ such that either ux′W (x′) < ux′W (∅) or there is
x ∈ A with xW = x′W and ux′W (x′) < ux′W (x).
1.1.2. Salaries. A matching market with salaries is described by:
• (finite, disjoint) sets W of workers, F of firms, and S ⊆ R+ of
salaries;
• for each worker w ∈ W , a utility function vw : F ∪{∅}×S → R;
and for each firm f ∈ F , a utility function vf : ∪A⊆WA×S → R;
all utility functions are one-to-one (preferences are strict).
We can suppose that S is the set {0, 1, . . . L} of the first L + 1 non-
negative integers, for some L.
For a firm f , vf defines a demand function Df : S
W → 2W by
Df (s) = argmaxA⊆Wvf ({(w, sw) : w ∈ A}).
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I restrict attention to demand functions, not correspondences, by virtue
of Hatfield and Milgrom’s assumption of strict preferences. Say that
D satisfies gross substitutes if, for any two vectors of salaries, s and
s′, if s ≤ s′ and sw = s′w then w ∈ D(s) implies that w ∈ D(s′).
A matching is a function µ : W → F ∪ {∅} × S. A matching
assigns to each worker a firm and a salary; I use the µ(w) = (∅, 0)
notation for when w is unmatched (unemployed). A matching spec-
ifies, for each firm f a collection of workers with their corresponding
salaries: µ0(f) = {(w, s) : (f, s) = µ(w)}. The set µ0(f) is thus the set
of workers employed by f , and their salaries, in the matching µ.
The tuple (F,W, S, (vf ), (vw)) describes a matching market with salaries.
A matching µ is individually rational if, for every f and w,
vf (µ
0(f)) ≥ vf (B) for all B ⊆ µ0(f) and vw(µ(w)) ≥ vw(∅, 0).
A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and if, for
any firm f and A ⊆ W , if there is a vector of salaries (sw)w∈A with
vf ({(w, sw) : w ∈ A}) > vf (µ0(f)) then there is w ∈ A with vw(µ(w)) >
vw(f, sw).
1.2. Embedding. Let (F,W,X, (uf ), (uw)) be a matching market with
contracts, and (F,W, S, (vf ), (vw)) a matching market with salaries. An
embedding of (F,W,X, (uf ), (uw)) into (F,W, S, (vf ), (vw)) is a one-
to-one function g which maps each x ∈ X into a triple (xF , xW , s) ∈
F ×W × S.
Let g be such an embedding and A ⊆ X. Say that g(A) defines a
matching if for any w there is at most one s and f with (f, w, s) ∈
g(A). The matching defined by A under g is the function µ : W →
F × S defined by µ(w) = (f, s) if g−1(f, w, s) ∈ A and µ(w) = (∅, 0)
otherwise.
Theorem 1. Let (F,W,X, (uf ), (uw)) be a matching market with con-
tracts. If firms’ choices satisfy substitutability, then there is a match-
ing market with salaries (F,W, S, (vf ), (vw)), and an embedding g of
(F,W,X, (uf ), (uw)) into (F,W, S, (vf ), (vw)) such that
(1) firms’ demand functions in (F,W, S, (vf ), (vw)) satisfy gross sub-
stitutes;
(2) A ⊆ X is a set of stable contracts if and only if g(A) defines a
stable matching.
The proof of Theorem 1 works by constructing an embedding. As
suggested in the introduction, the Pareto frontier of contracts is “one-
dimensional:” what is better for the worker is worse for the firm. So
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Pareto optimal contracts may be translated into salaries, with the bet-
ter contracts for the firm defining lower salaries, and the better con-
tracts for the worker defining higher salaries. The problem is that a
firm’s ranking over contracts might be affected by the firm’s other hires.
For example, consider contracts x and x′, both involving worker w and
firm f . Suppose that x is better than x′ for f , and x′ is better than x
for w; so we would map x into a lower salary than x′. In the absence
of substitutes, this mapping might be affected by the presence of other
contracts. However, since x′ is rejected by f when x is available, substi-
tutes make sure that it will continue to be rejected when other workers
and contracts are available. So the assumption of substitutes allows for
the pairwise mapping of contracts into salaries to work globally, when
all workers and firms are considered.
Proof. Say that a contract x is dominated for xF and xW if there
is a contract x′ with xF = x′F , xW = x
′
W , uxF (x
′) > uxF (x) and
uxW (x
′) > uxW (x). Let Xfw be the set of all contracts x with xF = f
and xW = w that are not dominated for f and w. Note that Xfw
can be ordered by uw; that is, I can enumerate the elements of Xfw
as x1, . . . , x|Xfw| with uw(xi) < uw(xi+1). Then I can write Xfw =
{(w, s) : s = 1, . . . , |Xfw|} with the understanding that (w, s) corre-
sponds to offering worker w the contract xs in Xfw. Note that s < s
′
if and only if uf ({w, s}) > uf ({w, s′}): by definition, if s < s′ then
uw(f, s) < uw(f, s
′) so uf ({w, s}) < uf ({w, s′}) would imply that (w, s)
is dominated.
Let K = max{|Xfw| : f ∈ F,w ∈ W} and S = {1, 2, . . . , K + 1}.
For convenience, lets augment the contracts in Xfw to include (w, s)
with |Xfw| < s ≤ K + 1. Assume that if s > |Xfw| then, for all A,
(w, s) /∈ Cf (A). The embedding g is the mapping that takes x ∈ X
into (f, w, s) with (w, s) being the representation of x in Xfw if x is
not dominated, and into (xF , xF , K + 1) if it is.
2
Define firms’ and workers’ utilities as follows. Let vw(f, s) = uw(x),
where x ∈ Xfw corresponds to s. Let vf ((w1, s1), . . . , (wn, sn)) =
uf ((w1, s1), . . . , (wn, sn)). For a vector of wages s = (sw)w∈W ∈ SW , let
Xsf ⊆ Xf be the set of contracts (w, sw). Define a demand function Df
for firm f by Df (s) = Cf (X
s
f ) (this is consistent with our definition of
utility for f).
I shall now prove that Df satisfies the GS property. Let X
s+
f =
{(w, s) ∈ W × S : s ≥ sw}, where sw denotes w’s salary in s. I first
2Strictly speaking, for dominated x we would need to set g(x) = (xF , xF ,K+ l),
choosing l ≥ 1 so that g remains one-to-one.
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prove that Cf (X
s
f ) = Cf (X
s+
f ). If X
s+
f = X
s
f then there is nothing to
prove. Let (w, s) ∈ Xs+f \Xsf . There must exist some s′, with s′ < s and
(w, s′) ∈ Xs+f . Note that s′ < s implies (w, s) /∈ Cf ({(w, s), (w, s′)})
because uf (w, s) < uf (w, s
′) and Cf ({(w, s), (w, s′)}) cannot contain
two contracts with the same worker. So {(w, s), (w, s′)} ⊆ Xs+f implies,
by the property of substitutability, that (w, s) /∈ Cf (Xs+f ). Thus I have
shown that Cf (X
s+
f ) ⊆ Cf (Xsf ). Since Xsf ⊆ Xs+f , the definition of Cf
implies that Cf (X
s+
f ) = Cf (X
s
f ).
Now, let s = (sw) and s
′ = (s′w) be vectors with s ≤ s′ while for
w0 ∈ W , sw0 = s′w0 and w0 ∈ Df (s). Suppose by way of contradiction
that w0 /∈ Df (s′). Then (w0, s′w0) /∈ Cf (Xs
′
f ) = Cf (X
s′+
f ). But then
Xs
′+
f ⊆ Xs+f so substitutability implies that (w0, s′w0) /∈ Cf (Xs+f ). Now,
Cf (X
s+
f ) = Cf (X
s
f ) and (w0, sw0) = (w0, s
′
w0
) implies that (w0, sw0) /∈
Cf (X
s
f ), a contradiction.
The proof that A is stable in (F,W,X, (uf ), (uw)) if and only if g(A)
is stable in (F,W, S, (vf ), (vw)) is straightforward. 
2. Discussion
2.1. Antecedents. The identification of contracts and salaries is not
new. Both Crawford and Knoer (1981), and Kelso and Crawford
(1982), mention how salaries can be interpreted as contracts. Roth
(1984), who presents an early model of matching with contracts, also
identifies contracts with salaries. The new observation here is that sub-
stitutability is important for the identification of contracts and salaries.
It is not mentioned in the literature that follows Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005).
2.2. Quasilinearity. In Kelso and Crawford, firms’ profits are quasi-
linear, but their existence proof is more general and does not depend
on quasilinearity. One detail is that they require a salary that is high
enough so no worker would be hired at that salary (see their Lemma 2).
In the embedding in the theorem, we do have such a salary.
2.3. Bilateral substitutes. In a model of matching with contracts,
Hatfield and Kojima (2010) present a generalization of substitutes,
called bilateral substitutes. They show stable matching with con-
tracts exists under bilateral substitutes. Here I show that the model of
Hatfield-Kojima cannot be embedded into the Kelso-Crawford model.
The following example is from Hatfield and Kojima (2010). Let the
set of firms be {f, f ′}, the set of workers {w,w′} and the set of contracts
be {x, x˜, z, z˜, z′}. Let x and x˜ involve firm f and worker w, while z
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and z˜ involve worker w′ and firm f . Contract z′ is between w′ and f ′.
Suppose that agents’ utilities are such that their preferences are:
f f ′ w w′
{x, z} {z′} x˜ z
{z˜} ∅ x z′
{x˜} ∅ z˜
{x} ∅
{z}
∅.
I have omitted the alternatives that are worse than ∅. Suppose that
there is a embedding, where x maps to the salary sx and x˜ to the salary
sx˜. Then x /∈ Cf ({x, x˜}) means that sx > sx˜. This would imply that
uf (xW , zW , sx, sz) < uf (x˜W , zW , sx˜, sz),
as xW = x˜W , which is incompatible with the preferences above.
I should clarify that a deviation from substitutes does not by it-
self prevent the model with contracts from being embeddable into a
model with salaries. The structure of bilateral substitutes is interest-
ing because it is a deviation from substitutes for which existence is
guaranteed.
2.4. Algorithm. Under the embedding, the algorithm proposed by
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) is equivalent to the algorithm proposed
by Kelso and Crawford (1982). It is easy to see that they are equivalent
because the two algorithms find the same matching: the firm-optimal
or the worker-optimal matching, depending on how the algorithms are
formulated.
Here, I want to show that the algorithms not only calculate the same
matchings, but that they also work in essentially the same way: the
algorithms take equivalent routes to a stable matching. The Hatfield-
Milgrom algorithm starts by each firm f “offering” the best contracts
for f , and the workers sequentially rejecting offers. In the embedding,
the best contracts correspond to the lowest salaries; and, in a similar
vein, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm starts at the lowest salaries. In
Hatfield-Milgrom, when a contracts gets rejected, it is as if the salary
for that worker is raised. Similarly, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm
works by raising the salaries of workers who reject an offer. Broadly
speaking, the steps taken by the Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm repre-
sent movements along the Pareto frontier of contracts; movements in
a direction which corresponds to higher salaries in the Kelso-Crawford
model.
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The following example illustrates the point, and hopefully helps un-
derstand the nature of the embedding better.
Suppose there are two firms and two workers: F = {f1, f2} and
W = {w1, w2}. Let X = {x1, x3, x2, y1, y2} be the set of contracts.
The agents’ preferences are:
f1 f2 w1 w2
{x1} {y2} x3 y1
{x2} {x3} x2 ∅
{y1} ∅ x1
∅ ∅.
The Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm takes the steps in the following ta-
ble. I am using the same notation as Hatfield-Milgrom: RW and RF
are the rejected contracts of, respectively, workers and firms.
XW RW (XW ) XF RF (XF )
0) ∅ ∅ X {x2, y1, x3}
1) {x1, y2} {y2} X {x2, y1, x3}
2) {x1, y2} {y2} {x1, x2, x3, y1} {x2, y1}
3) {x1, y2, x3} {x1, y2} {x1, x2, x3, y1} {x2, y1}
4) {x1, y2, x3} {x1, y2} {x2, x3, y1} {y1}
5) {x1, x2, x3, y2} {x1, x2, y2} {x2, x3, y1} {y1}
6) {x1, x2, x3, y2} {x1, x2, y2} {x3, y1} ∅
7) X {x1, x2, y2} {x3, y1} ∅
I shall interpret the iterations so as to simplify the comparison with
Kelso-Crawford. In (0) firms “offer” contracts x1 and y2 (they reject
contracts {x2, y1, x3}. In (1) the workers respond by w1 temporarily
accepting x1, while w2 rejects y2. In (2) the firms offer x1 and x3. In
(3) w1 accepts x3 and rejects x2. In (4) f1 offers x2 and f2 offers x3. (5)
w1 rejects x2. (6) f1 offers y1 and f2 offers x3. (7) the workers accept
y1 and x3.
We can embed this market with contracts into a market with salaries.
Let the set of salaries be {1, 2}. The relevant part of the agents’ pref-
erences are:
f1 : (w1, 1)  (w1, 2)  (w2, 1)
f2 : (w2, 1)  (w1, 1)
w1 : (f2, 1)  (f1, 2)  (f1, 1)
w2 : (f1, 1)
So, firm f1 prefers to hire w1 at a lower rather than a higher salary;
and prefers to hire w1 at either salary over hiring w2 at a salary of
1. I omit, for example, that for w1 (f2, 2)  (f2, 1) because firm f2 is
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unwilling to hire w1 at a salary of 2 (she prefers to leave the position
vacant).
Kelso and Crawford’s algorithm does:
w1 w2
0) (f1, 1) (f2, 1)
1) (f1, 1)(f2, 1)
2) (f1, 2)(f2, 1)
3) (f2, 1) (f1, 1)
The meaning of the iterations is the following. The algorithm starts
with all salaries being 1. At his vector of salaries, f1 demands worker
w1 while f2 demands worker w2. Worker w2 rejects the offer of firm
2 while w1 accept the offer from f1; this is indicated by underlining
the offer in the table. Since f2’s offer to w2 was rejected, the salary
for that pair increases to 2. At that salary, f2 decides not to offer to
w2 and instead demand w1 at a salary of 1. The rest of the iterations
should be intuitive. In any case, the steps are essentially those of
the Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm, where workers’ responses are included
within each step in the Kelso-Crawford algorithm, and as a separate
step in Hatfield-Milgrom. A general equivalence result is possible, but
requires writing down an algorithm that interprets the steps of one
algorithm in terms of the other.
2.5. Law of demand. In a matching model with contracts, a firm
f satisfies the law of aggregate demand if A ⊆ A′ implies |Cf (A)| ≤
|Cf (A′)|. In a matching model with salaries, a firm f satisfies the law
of aggregate demand if s ≥ s′ implies that |Df (s′)| ≥ |Df (s)|.
Using the embedding of Theorem 1, it is easy to show that if a
firm satisfies the law of aggregate demand in the matching model with
contracts, then it satisfies the law of aggregate demand in the embedded
matching model with salaries.
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